The return of Sisyphus

Aditya Sinha
First Published : 13 Feb 2010 11:47:00 PM IST
Last Updated : 13 Feb 2010 12:24:10 AM IST

Yesterday, a patent absurdity was printed in an otherwise staid newspaper. It was about India’s initiative for the resumption of dialogue with Pakistan, suspended after Mumbai was attacked by Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists in November 2008. The newspaper venerably reported that a “pressing” consideration for India’s initiative was that New Delhi needed some flexibility in case another terrorist attack took place. A government official was quoted saying that if the two countries were talking and an attack took place, the talks could be suspended; if they were not talking, then the victim country (that’s us) would be under enormous political pressure “to react in ways that might be counterproductive”. This is a stunning adventure in logic.

To recap: on February 4, India disclosed that it had proposed the resumption of dialogue. The proposal may have been made as far back as two weeks earlier. Perhaps the Indian admission was designed to provoke an early response from Pakistan. In any case it was ill-timed because it came on the day that Pakistan Chief of Army Staff Ashfaq Parvez Kayani said that his force was “India-centric” and would remain that way till disputes over Kashmir and water were resolved. That was not all; it took Islamabad another week to announce that it would resume the dialogue, making it appear as if the Pakistanis were doing us a favour by improving bilateral relations.

Of course, countries should always talk. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh adopted this simple and lucid principle when he spoke in Parliament on July 29, 2009: “Unless you want to go to war with Pakistan… dialogue and engagement are the best way forward.” It has also been clear ever since the UPA returned to power, but especially so since the PM appointed Shiv Shankar Menon as his new National Security Adviser, that his main project in this tenure would be a settlement with Pakistan. With such a clear goal, and a clear principle guiding him, the absurd suggestion that we-have-to-talk-in-case-there’s-another-terrorist-attack is inexplicable.

It is also alarming. We have had several waves of warning that an attack was imminent: a fortnight ago, our intelligence agencies were warning us that the LeT had purchased para-gliders and were possibly going to swoop down on our cities on kamikaze missions of the 9/11-kind. At the same time, the US issued an advisory to its citizens against travelling to India over the next few months, saying that terrorist attacks in India were possible. Ten days before that, American Defense Secretary Robert Gates, during a visit to the subcontinent, warned that Islamists of al-Qaeda variety were trying to provoke an India-Pakistan war through another terrorist attack. With this backdrop, the reasoning given by the anonymous official seems to confirm that a major terrorist attack is on the way, that it is only a matter of time before it happens, and there is nothing much our government can do except wait for the inevitable.

To then restart a dialogue with Pakistan for the express purpose of suspending it when the attack does take place seems hare-brained. For one thing, just because the government is talking does not mean the UPA will not face the enormous political pressure to do something drastic if another terrorist attack on the scale of the Mumbai siege takes place. If another attack holds the nation hostage for three days, the UPA can expect more than just some candlelight gatherings in Mumbai. Remember, the families of hostages of IC-814 that was hijacked to Kandahar in 1999 produced enough pressure on the government of the day to make it cave in and release three lethal terrorists. If no one can predict the next terrorist strike, then no one can predict public reaction either. Indians do not have endless patience.

Secondly, restarting a dialogue on such spurious grounds also undermines how effective this dialogue will be. The approach itself gives rise to suspicion that perhaps the Americans have arm-twisted India into restarting the dialogue, at the behest of the Pakistanis, who have threatened not to conduct any more offensives against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in their western regions for the next six months, which threatens President Barack Obama’s announced timetable for the commencement of withdrawal of troops in July 2011. Not surprisingly, the expectations in New Delhi from the resumption of dialogue are very low.

You might argue that perhaps the talks start with a lot of mutual suspicion, but once underway will pick up momentum. The history of India-Pakistan talks belies this. The last time that the bilateral dialogue actually picked up momentum was under the personal supervision of former President Pervez Musharraf, who used a back-channel to set up conditions for a settlement in Kashmir in 2006-’07. Much to New Delhi’s dismay, Islamabad has now jettisoned any connection with this back-channel build-up. Qureshi recently repudiated his predecessor Khurshid Kasuri’s claims about the back-channel progress, clearly signalling to New Delhi that we have to go back to square one; and by the anti-India demonstration by jihadis in PoK on the day after New Delhi announced its proposal, Pakistan signalled that when we return to square one, we do so on their terms.

Under a Pakistani military dictator, it took seven years to build momentum. Under an army-run democracy, it would take even longer. For a 76-year-old prime minister who has made a settlement with Pakistan his main project for his last years in office, this must be something of a heartbreaker.

Perhaps India has no choice. Pakistan has had a succession of good luck of late. Obama’s timetable for withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan has opened many doors for Islamabad. The US hurry has meant that it has come around to a future settlement with “some elements” in the Taliban, and Islamabad has quickly offered itself as the go-between. It is not difficult to see how poorly an American attempt to engage the Taliban will end. Nonetheless, Pakistan’s importance has increased exponentially, and it made clear at the January-end London conference that India should have no role to play in Afghanistan. And when it talks to India, Kayani’s statement made clear that talks will be about the terms on which we give them water and Kashmir.

A settlement with Pakistan is not visible for several years into the future. That doesn’t mean we should not talk, even if our expectations are rock-bottom. We should talk, and not because terrorism is imminent. For while we talk, India’s economy continues to grow, while no such guarantee can made about Pakistan. That fact alone will probably give us the flexibility we are looking for in our diplomacy in the decade ahead.